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I. OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS; 
PLAINTIFF OMITTED FACTS WHICH SHOW THAT THE CITY DID NOT 
PERFORM BUT BREACHED THE CONTRACT AND ACTED IN BAD FAITH. 
A. The City Issued Licenses by its Mayor, the Next Mayor Filed Suit Claiming 
That the Licenses Did Not Conform to the Then Existing Ordinances. 
In 1979 Plaintiff, through its mayor Alton Ball, issued "licenses" to the Defendant 
granting him the right to erect and maintain billboard signs along 1-80 in the City limits. (R 37) 
In 1982 a new mayor, Merlin Johnson, (who is also the current mayor) caused the City to file a 
lawsuit alleging that the licenses issued by Mayor Ball did not meet the requirements of the then 
current zoning ordinance. That ordinance required that "permits" be issued through the City's 
designated representative or the City council. (Trial Exhibit 30, Appellant's Addendum) Since 
Mayor Ball issued "licenses" instead of permits; and since the City Council did not pass on the 
"licenses," Mayor Johnson felt that the "licenses" did not properly comply with the City 
ordinances, and filed suit. In 1983 the "Stipulation" was entered into by the parties. (Appellant's 
Addendum) 
This background is important since the Defendant maintains that the City has acted in bad 
faith from the beginning and up to this appeal. The basis of alleging of bad faith is that the City 
knew that the original licenses were issued in good faith by the City in 1979; they were issued by 
the City's designated representative (Mayor Ball); they substantially complied with the 
ordinance; and that the Defendant's reliance on the actions of the City was reasonable. On 
March 24, 1983 the City Council Minutes reflect the following: 
1 
Mayor Merlyn Johnson mentioned the bill boards with All Associates. He 
mentioned the present schedule of the present bill boards. The Mayor said that 
the place where Billy's used to be is now open. It could be used as a "Welcome to 
Coalville" sign. Al Lundgren said his cost would not be more than $5,200.00.l If 
Coalville bought the sign, they would take over the lease on the land until it runs 
out with C.B. Copely. Terry Christiansen said the bill should be itemized. He 
suggested that we make a decision now so this can be settled. He suggested 
buying the sign so that we have a chance of getting the rest of the signs down in 
the future. If we don't buy the sign, we will be back in litigation and with our 
present zoning ordinances, we would probably loose. (Sic) If the City buys the 
sign, they will have to maintain it. As long as the contract is in force, we would 
hawe to pay the $200.00 a year and lease the property. Terry Christiansen said 
we have four choices: 1. Sign the agreement and buy the sign so that all the signs 
wiill be down in 20 years, 2. Go with the law suit that we will probably loose, 
(sic) leaving the signs up indefinitely, 3. Drop the law suit and the signs will be up 
as long as he wants them, or 4. Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made a motion 
that we purchase the sign in order to close the litigation. Colleen R. Sargent 
seconded the motion. All ayes, but Grant Geary who opposed. The Mayor and 
Attorney signed the Order of Dismissal.2 (Addendum Trial Exhibit 26.) 
City Attorney Christiansen knew their suit was not in good faith. He also knew that the 
City had to sign the Stipulation and buy a sign in order to eventually get the signs out. He 
explained that to the City Council. The City Council agreed and voted to buy the sign. (R. 217-
219.) But the City never made the purchase - they did not even tell the Defendant that they had 
made the decision to purchase. The bad faith arises from the fact that the Plaintiff has known 
since 1983 that (1) it did not file a lawsuit with merit and (2) that in order to make the Stipulation 
binding it had to purchase a sign. They were willing to do or say anything to avoid going to 
court and still be able to remove signs. 
1
 Lundgren was not present at this meeting, this is a fact reported to the City 
Council by the City Attorney or the Mayor. 
2
 This is the entire text of the minutes from March 24, 1983 regarding the signs. 
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B. The Sole Issue on Appeal in 1987 Was Whether the Stipulation Was 
Enforceable Because the Defendant Believed He Withdrew His Signature. 
Another omitted significant fact is that the Defendant believed that he withdrew his 
signature from the Stipulation. (R 120) Although the City ratified the Stipulation, no notice of 
ratification was provided to the Defendant, neither did the City act on any of its responsibilities. 
This failure to act enforced the Defendant's good faith belief that neither he nor the City 
considered the Stipulation binding for a period of almost three years. (R 119) Then in 1986 the 
City moved for an order to have a sign removed. The Defendant resisted claiming that the 
Stipulation was not enforceable because he had withdrawn. This was the sole issue, which was 
heard on a motion (i.e., no testimony, nor evidence) before Judge Daniels in 1986, and on which 
he ruled. This is the only issue submitted to the Supreme Court. It refused to consider the 
matter. (Plaintiffs fact #19. Pg 8, states that the appeal was based on the lack of compliance by 
the City of the Stipulation, the correct fact should read that the appeal was based on defendant's 
contention that the Stipulation was invalid because defendant withdrew his signature.) 
C. The Plaintiff Took No Action to Show its Intent to Honor the Stipulation 
until 1987, and Then it Was Only to Demand Performance of the Defendant, 
Not to Tender its Own Performance. 
From 1983 through 1987 the Defendant acted and believed that the Stipulation was not 
enforceable. Ironically, the City also treated the Stipulation with contempt for the same period of 
time because (a) it did not issue permits until 1986 (R 182), and those were invalid; (b) it did not 
take any action to purchase or lease a sign (other than to approve a purchase in a City Council 
meeting - which decision was never communicated to the Defendant) and (c) it did not make any 
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effort to publish the preference for the Defendant - all of which were required by the Stipulation. 
Other facts absent or otherwise erroneous from Plaintiffs "statement of facts" include: 
1) The City Council voted to purchase a sign from Defendant on the date it ratified the 
Stipulation. Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit 26. This was a duty imposed by the Stipulation, 
paragraph 1. The City never followed through on the purchase, neither did it ever notify the 
Defendant of its decision. (R. 993; Plaintiffs Statement of Facts #14; Plaintiffs Brief p. 8.) 
2) Although the City Council approved the Stipulation, there is no record in the minutes 
that the City ever approved issuance of permits to the Defendant, nor any direction to the Mayor 
or any other city representative to issue the permits. There is a record of another City employee 
issuing permits after the 'new' 1983 ordinance was passed . (R 259) Terry Christiansen, City 
attorney during the negotiations and to 1988 (R. 75) could not recall whether the council passed 
on the permits (R. 78, 87) although he did recall that the City elected to buy a sign. (R. 85) He 
further stated that the City wanted to wait to issue the permits until the new ordinance went into 
effect. (R 87) This, of course, would require that the permits would conform to the new 
ordinance. Mayor Johnson stated that he signed the permits sometime in 1985, but did not know 
whether the permits were ever delivered to the Defendant. (R 220, 253). Mayor Johnson could 
not find evidence of authorization in the City Council minutes, (R 221 - 222) and further 
admitted that he did not know whether as mayor he could sign the permits, but that he did so in 
ignorance of the law and claimed he did so on advice of the City Council and attorney. (R 239) 
3) The invalid sign permits were issued by the Mayor, immediately prior to the removal 
date of the first sign, some three years after the signing of the Stipulation. (Exhibit 25; R. 182) 
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4) The City amended its sign ordinance about a year after approving the Stipulation. It 
took no action prior to that date, nor in the amended ordinance, to publish the preference required 
under the Stipulation. (Plaintiffs Brief, Statement of Facts #s 10, 11, p. 7.) 
D. The Plaintiffs Recital of Facts from the Trial Is Incorrect; the Defendant 
Proved He Suffered Damages; the City Made Its Decision to Purchase 
Absolving the Defendant of Any Duty to Supply Additional Cost 
Information; and the City Neglected to Admit That the It Misrepresented to 
the District Court That the City Had an Interest in a Certain Sign When in 
Fact It Knew That It Had No Such Interest. 
1) The City claims that the Defendant did not prove any damages arising from the invalid 
'new' permits. However, testimony was given at trial by both the Defendant and an expert 
witness about the loss of value directly relating to the invalid permits. (Defendant's Exhibit 36; 
R. 320, 339, 342; 433; 372; 390; 401.) 
2) The City claims that no sign lease or cost information was provided after the signing of 
the Stipulation. (Appellee's Fact 13. Page 7-8) However, the City already had made its choice 
to purchase a sign based on previously submitted information on the date it decided to ratify the 
Stipulation. There was no reason to provide information to assist the City in its choice to lease or 
purchase a sign, since it had already made that decision! Moreover, the City never requested any 
additional information. 
3) Plaintiff raises in its fact number 24, p 9-10 that the Defendant was cited for contempt 
for removing a "certain" sign. The background facts show that the Defendant contracted with the 
Coalville Chamber of Commerce, which was not associated with the City in any manner; for a 
sign to promote Coalville businesses. The Plaintiff omits to state that it knowingly and 
intentionally misrepresented to the district court that the Plaintiff had an interest in that sign and 
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that the sign was part of a fulfillment of the Stipulation to benefit the City. The order arising 
from the hearing required the Defendant to keep that sign in place for the benefit of the City. 
The Defendant later removed the sign. (R 138-152) The court did not sanction the City for its 
misrepresentation, although it certainly had sufficient grounds to do so. It is important to note 
that the Defendant took down the Chamber sign under the terms of the agreement with the 
Chamber (the sign was a public service sign for the Chamber, it paid $600 for part of the cost of 
painting, nothing for the monthly rental); that the removal followed the misrepresentation by the 
City to the court, and followed several years where the City refused to obey any of its obligations 
under the Stipulation, yet continued to demand strict adherence by the Defendant. The removal 
of the sign was in accord with the Defendant's agreement of the Chamber. 
The City's complaint for contempt did not relate to any harm to the City. Indeed it is 
dubious that the City had the standing to raise the issue of contempt since it did not have any 
interest in the Chamber sign in the first place. If there is a issue over the removal of the sign it 
should be with the Chamber - who never objected to the removal of the sign - not with the City. 
II. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RECISSION. 
Plaintiff states that the "Defendant has been granted permits allowing him to maintain his 
signs along Interstate 80 for the past 13 years. (Plaintiffs Brief, p. 12) The foundational fact 
statement for Plaintiffs argument does not disclose that the "permits" issued to the Defendant 
were invalid. These permits were not issued until 1986, almost three years after the Stipulation 
was signed. Furthermore, these "permits" were not issued in conformance with the sign 
ordinance which was in force at the time the permits were issued, which required the zoning 
administrator to approve and issue the permits. In late 1985 Mayor Johnson claims that he issued 
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the permits - in ignorance of the requirements of the ordinance which was passed in 1983 - on 
advice of the City Council and the attorney, but he could not find any reference in any City 
Council meeting for that approval. These permits were no better than the original "licenses" 
which the City claims were invalid when it filed the lawsuit in 1982. It is ironic that Mayor 
Johnson instituted suit against the Defendant claiming he did not have the proper permits 
according to the City ordinances;3 then he turned around and ignored the City ordinances to issue 
invalid permits. That is quintessential bad faith. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was entitled to retain his signs over the period of years, both 
by the terms of the Stipulation and by provision of law which does not require the Defendant to 
perform when the Plaintiff is in breach. Plaintiffs inference that Defendant suffers no damages 
because he retained some signs ignores the damages from the wrongfully removed signs and 
damages from the other breaches of the City. 
Plaintiff does not cite any reference for its claim that the Defendant must satisfy three 
factors to be entitled to rescission. However, Defendant satisfies these factors: (1) the City did 
materially breach its obligations, (2) notice of rescission was raised in 1985; and (3) the 
Defendant is before this court with clean. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff raised the issue of notice for the first time on appeal, and this court 
should not consider it. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
3
 The original ordinance required an applicant to obtain permits from the City 
Council or designated representative. The Defendant obtained licenses from the Mayor. He 
relied on the instructions and guidance of the mayor. Trial Exhibit 30. 
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A. Coalville City Is in Material Breach of the Stipulation; the Stipulation Fails 
for Lack of Consideration; the Plaintiff Was Never Found in Substantial 
Compliance of the Stipulation; the Defendant Suffered Actual Damages. 
1. Defendant Finds No Order Stating the City Is in Substantial 
Compliance of the Stipulation. 
Plaintiff commences its defense that the City is not in material breach by asserting that 
the City has substantially complied with the terms of the Stipulation according to certain court 
orders. (Plaintiffs Brief p. 13) But this statement is not supported by the court orders. Judge 
Daniels issued an order dated June 23, 1986; it did not state that the City substantially complied. 
Judge Daniels issued another order dated September 22, 1986 denying Defendant's Motion to 
Alter or Amend the June 23, 1986 order; it did not state that the City substantially complied. 
Judge Hansen issued an order dated September 6, 1989; it did not state that the City substantially 
complied. Judge Noel, in 1995, did not find that the City substantially complied, in fact found 
that the City was liable for judgment for its breach. Defendant is not aware of any other orders.4 
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the appeal in 1986 was based on a "substantial 
compliance order" by the district court in 1986. That order does not make a finding of 
substantial compliance. That order, later appealed, was issued arising from the a hearing from an 
Order to Show Cause why a sign should not be removed according to the terms of the 
Stipulation. Defendant opposed arguing only that they had withdrawn their signatures before the 
City accepted and signed the Stipulation. (R. 120) The lower court only held that the Stipulation 
4
 Defendant searched all of the orders and did not locate any record of where any 
court entered an order or made a finding that the Plaintiff substantially complied. Even if such 
an order exists, it would not be based on a complete hearing of the facts, since only one trial was 
held, all other orders resulted from law and motion hearings without testimony. 
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was enforceable. (Order dated June 23, 1986.) The Supreme Court refused to consider the 
appeal. There was no trial nor evidence on the issues, only a hearing before the court on the 
City's Motion.5 
2. The Stipulation Fails under Contract Principles and Should Not Be 
Enforced. 
The Stipulation fails for lack of consideration. A stipulation is an agreement of 
compromise and settlement and constitutes an executory accord.6 Since an executory accord 
"constitutes a valid enforceable contract,"7 basic contract principles affect the determination of 
when a settlement agreement should be so enforced. Mascaro v.Davis. 741 P.2D 938, 942, 943 
(1987). A contract fails for lack of consideration (or mutuallity, supra.) The Defendant did not 
obtain any consideration from the City arising from the Stipulation.8 
One of the cornerstone rules of contract law is that an agreement must be supported by 
adequate consideration. Resource Mgt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1036 (Utah 1985). Consideration is an act or promise bargained for and given in exchange for a 
5
 When motions by the Plaintiff and Defendant were reviewed at a pre-trial 
conference held by Judge Brian in 1995, the court reviewed the file and acknowledged that there 
had never been a full and complete consideration of all of the issues, only piecemeal 
consideration of fragmented issues. Judge Brian ordered that a trial on all issues be held. The 
trial court was the only court to consider all of the issues. 
6
 L & A DrywalL Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980) 
(citing Cox Constr. Co. v. State Road Comm'n. 583 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1978)). 
7
 Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982); see 
Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 699 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Utah 1985). 
8
 The City stated in trial that it had not sustained damages and only sought its 
attorney fees. It did not tender any consideration, nor did it sustain damages. The Stipulation 
was a windfall for the City, since it knew it would lose the lawsuit if tried. (Addendum, March 
24, 1983 minutes.) 
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promise. Id. Consideration may be found "whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where [a] 
promisee suffers a detriment." Gasser v. Home. 557 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976); Sugarhouse 
Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d 
628, 632 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Whether a particular benefit or detriment may serve as 
consideration to support a contract is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson. 120 Wash.2d 178, 840 P.2d 851, 860 (1992). 
Judge Noel found that the City had breached because it did not purchase or lease a sign as 
required by paragraph 1. However, the Plaintiff expands the language and meaning of Judge 
Noel's determination when it implies he found: "the City's failure to purchase or lease a sign did 
not go to the consideration of the Stipulation." (Plaintiffs Brief p 15.) The court's findings and 
order do not make any such ruling. (Plaintiffs Addendum, Exhibit 1.) 
When these rules are applied to the facts it is clear the Defendant never got any 
consideration, but suffered a great harm. Defendant agreed to remove nine signs which have an 
undisputed value of $48,000 each, plus a loss of cash flow. (R 436-437.) In exchange the 
Plaintiff agreed to dismiss its lawsuit, which they acknowledged had no chance of success;9 
purchase or lease a sign; issue valid permits and publish the preference. The lawsuit was never 
dismissed, it is the same suit which is before this court; Plaintiff never made the purchase; the 
permits which were issued were invalid; and Plaintiff never published the preference. The 
Defendant did not get any consideration. 
9
 On March 24, 1983 the Stipulation was presented to the City Council for 
approval, the City Attorney advised the Council to approve the Stipulation because the City 
would probably lose the lawsuit. (Appellant's Addendum, Trial Exhibit 26.) 
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An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer, 
including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer. Williams v. Espey. 
11 Utah 2d 317, 322, 358 P.2d 903, 906 (1961); see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 43 (1963) (price and 
method of performance are two material terms of an offer). The burden of proof for showing the 
parties' mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is on the party claiming that there is 
a contract. B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst. 28 Utah 2d 442, 444, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972). 
Here the parties both treated the Stipulation as though it did not exist. The Plaintiff did not 
deliver permits for three years, and then they were invalid; although the Plaintiff voted to accept 
the Stipulation and purchase a sign, it never notified the Defendant; the Stipulation required the 
Plaintiff to publish a preference, but the Plaintiff failed to publish and instead approved two 
separate sign ordinances which banned off-premises signs. Not only did the Plaintiff not assent 
to the terms of the Stipulation, it took steps which diametrically opposed the intent of the 
Stipulation. Plaintiff fails to show it accepted the Stipulation in any way by its conduct. 
The contractual defense of impossibility is designed to relieve a party of its obligation 
under a contract where its performance has been rendered legally impossible. The defense has 
been defined as follows: 
Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed 
discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and 
without fault of the obligated party, which events makes performance of the 
obligation impossible or highly impracticable. Western Properties v. Southern 
Utah Aviation. 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App.1989) (footnotes omitted.) 
See also Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.. 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("a party 
may be relieved of performing an obligation under a contract where supervening events, 
unforeseeable at the time the contract is made, render performance of the contract impossible"). 
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The test for impossibility is not hard and fast, but must take into consideration at what point 
performance under the contract can no longer be reasonably required: "It is now recognized that 
'[a] thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is 
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.'" Transatlantic 
Fin. Corp. v. United States. 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C.Cir.1966). When the City passed its 1983 
ordinance it became impossible for the Defendant to realize the consideration for which he 
bargained. The City made off-premises signs illegal; using the City's interpretation of paragraph 
13 of the Stipulation, even if the City published the preference, the Defendant could never build 
an off-premise sign. Likewise, the City could not issue permits for off-premise signs because 
they were now illegal. The City's actions made the fulfillment of the Stipulation impossible, and 
the Defendant should be excused from performance from that date, late 1983. 
3. The Plaintiff Cannot Violate its Own Ordinances as an Excuse for 
Performance. 
The Plaintiff asserts that the permits were never challenged by the City. (Plaintiffs Brief 
p 15) This argument is self serving and hypocritical. The City filed suit when Mayor Ball 
issued "licenses" and a Mayor Johnson objected. There is nothing to stop the next mayor from 
asserting that Mayor Johnson's permits were not validly issued and demanding removal of the 
remaining 'permitted' signs. The City does not disagree that the permits are invalid, they just 
excuse their behavior by stating that they do not object to the permits. 
Sandy v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992) states that a City cannot ignore its 
own ordinances. "Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a statute and issues 
a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of administrative authority granted." 
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Travelers Indem. Co. v. Barnes. 191 Colo. 278, 552 P.2d 300, 303 (1976). Yet the City claims 
that it impliedly authorized issuance of permits in 1983 when it approved the Stipulation, and 
that the authorization was valid when the Mayor issued the permits in 1985-86. (Plaintiffs Brief 
pi 6) The authorization, if it exists at all, cannot last for three years. First there is no record that 
the City Council ever actually approved the sign permits in 1983 or any other time thereafter. 
Second, the new ordinance was an intervening event which requires that permits after enactment 
would have to comply with the new ordinance. Third, there are new City Council members 
sitting who may not have knowledge of any former implied agreements. The City gives no 
excuse for its three year delay to issue the permits. Just like it gives no excuse for its failure to 
purchase the sign, or its failure to publish the preference. The City cannot violate its own 
ordinances, nor pick and choose between the version of its ordinances. The City would certainly 
not tolerate an applicant to attempt to pick and choose between the ordinances it wants to abide. 
The City does not - and cannot - cite any case which supports its proposition.10 When the 
Coalville City Council changed its sign ordinance one must suppose that the change was for a 
purpose. Cf., Thompson v. Department of the Treasury. 557 F.Supp. at 167. 
In State v. Zeimer. 10 Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111,1113 (1960), the word "shall" was 
defined: "The word 'shall' is usually presumed to be mandatory. Other uses of the word 'shall' in 
the same provision are clearly mandatory. Therefore, the word should be so interpreted here." 
The language of the 1983 Coalville ordinance is likewise imperative and mandatory, and does 
10
 Cf., Wadsworth v. Santaquin Citv. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1938) 
(change in city charter supercedes previous form of government.) 
13 
not allow some other interpretation. The 'new' 1983 Development Ordinance § 8.4 reads: 
"Unless otherwise provided herein, no sign shall be erected, relocated or enlarged until the sign 
has been approved and a permit issued by the Zoning Administrator." It was under this 
ordinance that the permits for the signs should have been issued. It was also illegal under this 
ordinance to permit off-premise signs, so the permits were void, ab initio. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the defective permits issued by the City are clouded. 
Whether or not the City ever objects to the permits does not remove the cloud on the veracity of 
the permits. A third party buyer of Defendant's signs cannot rely on the assertions of Mayor 
Johnson that some future administrator may not object to the permits. The defective permits are 
no different than a cloud on a title of real property. Regardless of whether a party has objected 
does not remove the potential problem. The damage is not one which can be resolved by a 
statement from the City, it is one which can only be resolved by the issuance of valid permits. 
4. Defendant Suffered Damages and Is Entitled to an Award to 
Compensate Him. 
The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant reaped benefits by virtue of the signs, and did not 
suffer any damages. (Plaintiffs Brief pp 15 & 18) He was entitled to any benefits he received 
from his signs under the Stipulation. Furthermore, the Defendant and Defendant's expert 
witness testified at trial that the Defendant sustained damages as a result of the defective permits. 
The Defendant sustained $579,316 in deimages from the loss from signs removed and an 
additional $143,728 from lost profits from signs permits and construction which should have 
been given to Defendant under paragraph 13. (R. 339, 342, et seq.; 433 et seq.; Plaintiffs 
Addendum. Exhibit 36.) In addition, Mr. Card testified that the permits were valued at $40,000 
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each (R. 438) and that the signs were valued at about $48,000 each. (R. 437). The Defendant 
also lost the value of good will and prestige which would follow a preference published in an 
official City sign policy. 
The Defendant also sought its costs and attorney fees in the action. (R. 377, 442). 
Plaintiff does not mention that the trial was a result of various complaints, motions and 
orders to show cause filed by both parties. (Plaintiffs Brief p 18) These were to be considered 
at trial. Defendant incurred substantial legal expenses for defending the City's frivolous and 
unjustified persistence to have the signs remove, all the while refusing to perform. 
5. The Stipulation Is Drafted in Plain Language and Should Be 
Interpreted Accordingly. 
Plaintiff argues that paragraph 13, the preference to be published, only refers to "off-
premises" signs. The sign ordinance in effect at the time the Stipulation was drafted and signed 
provided for numerous different kinds of signs, i.e.: identification, bulletin board, overhanging, 
etc. (Defendant's Addendum, Exhibit 30, (§ 60.4.1(h)). If the City wanted to limit the type of 
signs for which it wanted to grant the preference it could have - and should have. The City was a 
substantial if not the primary drafter of the document. (R. 408; 424.) The language of 
paragraph 13 is not ambiguous, it states that a preference is to be published giving the Defendant: 
" priority over any applicant that does not have an existing sign. " Thus an applicant who already 
has a sign, but wishes an additional sign or to modify that sign can be granted a permit. But if an 
applicant does not have an existing sign, the permit must be offered first to the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff admits that it did not publish the priority required in paragraph 13. Then it 
erroneously states that the Defendant did not prove any damages. (Plaintiffs Brief p 20). The 
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testimony at trial by expert witness Card contradicts the Plaintiffs misleading statements. (R. 
438-439.) As does the testimony of the Defendant, who stated that the loss of the priority was 
worth $143,728. (R. 401.) There are not only the financial damages, but the loss in terms of the 
advantage of an "official endorsement" by having the Defendant's name in an City policy 
publication is of tremendous proportion. 
The findings of the trial court are not supported by the record. Defendant is entitled to 
rescission based on the material breaches by the Plaintiff. 
B. Defendant Is Entitled to Rescission Because the Parties Can Be Restored to 
Their Original Positions,. 
Plaintiff errs in concluding that the Defendant cannot be restored to its original position. 
This court can order that the Plaintiff issue valid permits for the signs and order that the signs be 
reinstalled. Since the City paid no compensation, nor gave any value for the Stipulation, it has 
not suffered any loss or damage for the past 13 years. The only "damages" to the City is the cost 
of its attorney. (R. 277.) The Defendant did not "enjoy the benefits of the Stipulation" as 
maintained by the Plaintiff. (Plaintiffs Brief P 21.) Contrary, the Defendant suffered damages 
and irreparable harm. Supra. Plaintiff errs in asserting that the Defendant cannot seek rescission 
and damages under general contract law. (Plaintiffs Brief P 22) Utah law expressly allows 
recission or damages as alternate remedies, or a combination as may be required to do justice. 
See, i.e., Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979). 
Plaintiff complains that the Defendant is not entitled to recission because he comes before 
the court with unclean hands. Plaintiff ignores the law which states that a party is not bound by a 
contract when the other party has breached the agreement. Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279, 280-
16 
281 (Utah 1972). Thus, although the City unilaterally attempted to force the Defendant to abide 
the terms of the Stipulation, while all along blatantly ignoring its own obligations, Defendant's 
recalcitrance in performing after Plaintiffs default is neither "bad faith" nor "unclean hands." 
The Defendant simply was utilizing a legal right. Unclean hands refers to some bad act against 
the Plaintiff which should preclude recovery by the Defendant. There is no such bad act.11 
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant failed to tender back what consideration it had 
received. (Plaintiffs Brief p. 21.) The Defendant never received any consideration from the 
City. Neither does the City claim any loss, other than its attorney fees - which were generated in 
bad faith because the City attempted to force the Defendant to abide an agreement which the City 
was in continual breach, and for which the City never tendered its own proper performance. 
C. The Defendant Put the Plaintiff on Notice About its Intent to Rescind the 
Agreement; Furthermore this Issue Is Raised for the First Time on Appeal 
and Should Not Be Considered. 
The Defendant's first objection to the Stipulation was that it was not enforceable because 
it was not properly executed, and was raised in 1985. When the Stipulation was ruled 
enforceable, the Defendant immediately objected to the lack of performance by the City and 
demanded rescission. This lack of performance was communicated to the City Council 
11
 The isolated instance where the Defendant was accused of violating a court order 
arose after the Plaintiff mis-represented to the court that it had a right to demand that the 
Defendant not remove the sign for the Chamber of Commerce. The violation was not against the 
Plaintiff, but arose from the Plaintiffs own misdeed in misrepresenting to the court that the 
Plaintiff had some enforceable right or interest in the Chamber sign when counsel knew all along 
and at that time that the City had no such interest. (R. 148-150.) That event is not relevant to 
the disposition of the disagreement between the parties. The Defendant did not act with unclean 
hands against the Plaintiff. Indeed, the Defendant removed four sign structures at great financial 
loss, while the Plaintiff failed to properly abide a single requirement placed on it by the 
Stipulation. 
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personally by the Defendant as well as through counsel. (R. 193.) The issue of timeliness of 
Defendant's claim for rescission is raised by the Plaintiff for the first time on appeal and should 
not be considered. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P.2d at 413. 
D. The Defendant Timely Prosecuted Its Case. 
The Defendant initially believed that the Stipulation had not been entered into by either 
party. The Defendant withdrew its signature, and the Plaintiff never gave any notice of its 
intention to honor the Stipulation or perform thereunder. The Plaintiff filed a motion to compel 
removal of a sign in 1986, which was resisted by the Defendant and eventually appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Defendant did not learn of the results of the appeal until 1988 or 1989. 
(R. 132.) In 1989 both parties filed motions, including a complaint by the Defendant. In 1990 
the Defendant filed bankruptcy and the matter was for a while under the jurisdiction of the 
Bankruptcy Court. In 1993, 1994 and 1995 the parties filed additional motions which 
culminated in the trial of all issues before Judge Noel in August, 1995. In addition, the 
Defendant frequently appeared before the City Council seeking to negotiate a settlement of the 
issues. (R. 192.) The claim that the Defendant did not timely prosecute his case is also raised for 
the first time on appeal, and should not be considered. Supra.12 
III. DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED AND IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 
The damages represented by Exhibit #36 and expert witness Card arise from the breaches 
committed by the City. Plaintiff attempts to construe these as damages arising from the removal 
12
 Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sought "continuance after continuance" 
inferring that the Defendant sought to delay the proceedings. (Plaintiffs Brief p. 28) The record 
is fairly equally balanced by requests from both parties for continuances. This issue is also raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
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of the signs. That is partly correct, and these damages are relevant to the extent that the court 
determines that damages are the correct remedy or should be used in conjunction with rescission. 
However, defendant and Mr. Card testified explicitly regarding the damages sustained by the 
Defendant. (Defendant's Exhibit 36; R. 320, 339, 342; 433; 372; 390; 401.) 
The Defendant described the damages he sustained because he was required to remove 
signs. These signs should have remained. The City had no right to require their removal because 
the City was in breach. The Defendant should have the signs restored; and he should be 
compensated for the lost income for the period of time that the signs are down. He should also 
be compensated for the cost of removal and reinstallation of the signs. 
Mr. Card testified to the general value of Defendant's signs. He also testified about the 
value of the promises, i.e., the damages arising from the breach of the City. If the Defendant 
cannot have his signs reinstalled, he is entitled, in addition to the lost revenues, to the value of 
the permits and publication as testified by Mr. Card. 
IV. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES; IF ANY PARTY IS 
SO ENTITLED IT IS THE DEFENDANT 
The Plaintiff admits that it (a) did not purchase or lease a sign; (b) that the permits issued 
three years after the signing of the Stipulation were not valid under the then current ordinance; 
and (c) that the City never published the preference which was required by paragraph 13. The 
trial court made the same findings. These admissions cover virtually every duty placed on the 
City, yet the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant's defense was "without merit and not asserted in 
good faith." The threshold for a meritorious and good faith defense is very low. Watkiss & 
Campbell v.Foa& Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
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Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) relied on by Plaintiff, states 'without merit' 
borders on frivolous and is defined as "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or 
fact." The facts are that the Plaintiff breached every single requirement of the Stipulation. The 
trial court awarded the Defendant damages based on his claims. Regardless of whether or not the 
trial court found that the conduct of the Plaintiff could be excused, the very fact that the Plaintiff 
admitted these breaches allows the Defendant to assert his defense in good faith. Watkiss, supra,. 
The fact that the trial court found the City breached also negates any 'without merit" claim. 
The Plaintiff also misstates the language of the 1986 order. (R, Exhibit 2.) That order 
only ordered the Defendant to remove a sign. It made no other finding about the City's 
performance - and neither did any other order. Therefore it is impermissible to infer that the 
court considered any other aspect of the performance of the parties. Furthermore, regardless 
whether a court order made a finding that the City was in substantial compliance, the Defendant 
is entitled to continue to assert the City's defaults. 
Plaintiff errs in concluding that just because the district court ordered the Defendant to 
remove signs that he lacked a meritorious defense. There was no full trial on the merits until 
August 1995. Prior to that time all of the court hearings were held on motions - which do not 
provide for complete factual hearings and testimony. The Defendant testified that one of his 
primary goals was to attempt a peaceful settlement with the Plaintiff. Arising from that intent the 
Defendant made numerous appearances with the City, and in several such meetings came very 
close to settlement. (R. 192.) There is a practical aspect to maintenance of signs within a City, 
and part of that aspect is to maintain cordial relationships, so that the City does not act arbitrary 
and capriciously to banish signs. In this case, the City had so acted in its ordinance of 1983. The 
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Defendant's hope was to gain an amicable settlement with the City which would foster a 
peaceful relationship between the parties. Ongoing settlement negotiations do not constitute 
abandonment of a case. Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) (lack of prosecutorial 
diligence was "reasonably excusable" in light of circumstances including settlement efforts, 
defendants' unrealized opportunities to initiate progress, lack of prejudice to defendants, and 
serious injustice as consequence of dismissal). 
Plaintiff also errs in concluding that just because the Plaintiff was granted orders to have 
signs removed, that such orders mean that the defenses raised by the Defendant were without 
merit and in bad faith. If that is the standard of law, then no appeal would ever succeed. The 
question to be analyzed is whether there was any good faith belief under the law or under the 
facts for the Defendant to maintain his defense. The facts are clear - the Plaintiff breached each 
of its duties under the Stipulation; the law is clear, the Defendant has no obligation to honor an 
agreement which the other party breaches. Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279, 280-281 (Utah 1972). 
The old maxim "what is good for the goose is good for the gander" should apply in this 
case. The Plaintiff admits that it did not properly or timely comply with any of its requirements, 
yet continually insisted that the Defendant be held to strict compliance with the Stipulation. The 
record is clear that the Plaintiff made a conscious decision to accept the Stipulation on March 24, 
1983 and purchase a sign, but it never even so much as communicated that decision to the 
Defendant, let alone make the purchase. The permits issued were three years late, and did not 
comply with the ordinance. The Plaintiff amended its ordinances twice, yet never attempted to 
even facially comply with the Stipulation to publish the preference, instead banned off-premises 
signs entirely. The Plaintiff seeks its attorney fees for its costs in requiring the signs to be 
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removed. Yet for the entire period of this litigation there is not a single time when the City 
complied in good faith with the terms of the Stipulation. Yet Plaintiff would require the removal 
of all of Defendant's signs and seek attorney fees for its trouble. If U.C.A. § 78-27-56 is applied 
to the Plaintiff, the results would be spectacularly interesting. The City defenses for failure to 
perform are summarized: 
a. purchase or lease - admits breach, no defense; 
b. defective untimely permits - admits breach; we didn't cure but we haven't 
objected (yet); 
c. failure to publish the preference - admits breach; we didn't have to because we 
changed the ordinance. 
These are the kind of actions which evince an action "without merit and not brought or asserted 
in good faith." The only defense actually raised by the Plaintiff is that they allege a ruling from a 
court which stated that the City had 'substantially performed' - Defendant did not find such a 
ruling. It was Defendant who summarily prevailed on his claims, the Plaintiff admitted and the 
judge confirmed on all accounts that the Plaintiff did not perform: no purchase; permits were 
invalid; and the preference was not published. The defenses raised by the Plaintiff 'are without 
merit. Defendant should be awarded its attorney fees under § 78-25-56. 
V. THE PLAINTIFF RELIES ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW FROM THE TRIAL COURT; THAT COURT DID NOT RELY ON THE 
LAW AND THE ORDER CITES NO CASE LAW SUSTAINING ITS POSITION. 
In its brief the Plaintiff makes a number of references to and in reliance on the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court. The court did not cite a single case in 
support of its ruling. A reading of that document discloses logical and legal inconsistencies. 
On page 3, paragraph 5, the trial court stated: "Plaintiff has never challenged the validity 
of the permits and Defendant has presented no evidence which shows that the permits are invalid 
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or unenforceable." The Defendant introduced at trial a copy of the current ordinance 
(Addendum) and copies of all of the minutes of the City Council for the time period in question. 
There was no record of a City Council approval; the permits were drafted and signed by the 
mayor, not the zoning administrator. The law states that a municipality cannot ignore its own 
ordinances13, yet the mayor ignored them in issuing the permits. The only evidence introduced 
by the City supporting the permits was the Mayor's statement that he issued the permits on 
authority of the City Council, but he could not state when that was given, nor could he find any 
reference in the Council minutes. (R. 221.) 
On page 4, paragraph 7, the trial court stated: "Plaintiff has passed an Ordinance making 
it illegal to construct off-premises signs. Nothing in the Stipulation prevented the City from 
adopting such an Ordinance." That is a technically correct statement regarding the language of 
the Stipulation, but it does not reflect the law. It ignores the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing required of parties to an agreement. Olympus Hills Shopping Center. Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App. 1994). It is not a legal excuse for 
performance. (See, discussion of contracts, supra.) 
On page 4, paragraph 8, the trial court stated: "No useful purpose would be served by 
requiring Plaintiff to publish Defendant's priority for off-premises signs along Interstate 80 
because such signs are unlawful under Plaintiffs present Zoning Ordinance." One useful 
purpose would have been at least to show intent to comply with the Stipulation. Another would 
be to anticipate that the Zoning Ordinance may change. This refusal ignores the covenant of 
Sandv v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). 
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good faith and fair dealing which is required of all parties to an agreement, id. It also ignores 
the doctrines discussed infra regarding contracts (i.e., consideration, mutuality, etc.). 
VI. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON ITS DAMAGE AWARD. 
Plaintiff errs when it states that the time of the Plaintiffs failure to purchase cannot be 
fixed at a particular time. The City made its election to purchase on March 24, 1983. Paragraph 
1 states: "when the Plaintiff determines to either lease or purchase the sign, Defendant agrees to 
provide and erect the sign face within sixty (60) days after notification by Defendant."14 The 
time for Plaintiffs performance is 60 days after March 24, 1983. If Defendant failed to perform, 
then Plaintiff had a duty to tender. However, the Plaintiff failed to give notice of its election. It 
cannot cause the default and then argue that the time for performance never commenced. 
Plaintiff relies on Nielson v. Droubay. 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), but misinterprets it. 
The Droubays had, in circumstances beyond their control, offered substantial compliance with an 
option to purchase; that compliance was accepted by the Nielsons and relied on by the Droubays. 
Delays in exercising an option did not injure the Droubays and the parties attempted to proceed 
jointly in resolving the problems. Here, however, the facts are inapposite. The Plaintiff has not 
substantially complied, and did not provide any performance upon which the Defendant relied. 
Utah law favors prejudgment interest: 
In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is 
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is 
fixed as of a particular time. Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 
177 (Utah App. 1993): 
14
 This wording is probably a typographical error, it should read "notice to 
Defendant" to allow the Defendant 60 days to erect the sign. 
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Here the damage is complete, the amount of loss can be fixed at a specific amount at a 
specific time, i.e., sixty days after March 28, 1983. Interest should be allowed also on the 
damages arising from the removal of the signs from the date the signs were removed. 
None of Plaintiff s arguments or objections to prejudgment interest were raised at trial 
and it is not appropriate to raise them here. Supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs arguments do not support the trial court's ruling. The trial court's ruling is 
not supported by the record. The Plaintiff breached each of its duties under the Stipulation, all of 
which were material. Its breach precluded any further duty of the Defendant to perform. The 
Defendant suffered cognizable damages and maintained a timely, good faith and meritorious 
defense. The Plaintiff did not maintain a meritorious defense, and acted in bad faith by filing a 
lawsuit it knew could not prevail; demanding performance while not tendering its own 
performance; by misrepresenting material facts to the district court about its interest in the 
Chamber sign; and by issuing invalid permits, no better than the original licenses. The order of 
the trial court should be set aside. Defendant is lawfully and equitably entitled to rescission of 
the Stipulation, judgment for the costs of restitution and damages, prejudgment interest and 
attorney fees. 
Respectfully Submitted t h i s^ ^ a a y of Ai 
/ALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT 
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ADDENDUM 
March 9, 1983 (cont) 
Zoning Hearing 
Ronny Moore mentioned that he is against the new Industrial Zoning along 
the railroad tracks. 
The concerned citizens wanted to know if the zoning would be voted on 
tonight? The Mayor said that the City Council will have a special 
meeting. Leon Simister said there are only three Councilmembers' here 
tonight and it would be best to have all present. 
William M. Judd mentioned that he appreciated these people coming out 
to let us know how they feel. He said he can't see why it can't be 
zoned to fit their needs. 
A special meeting will be held on Thursday, March 24, 1983 at 7:30 p.m. 
At this time, there will be a short discussion on the new proposed zoning 
ordinance before it is passed. They are invited to attend if they want 
to. 
Meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m. 
si-. 
SPECIAL 
//(7/fi£y„ ^'yUrfrt^hy&a-fvi: \) W k v - V ) \i^\i.„Q. Recorder 
ME^TJNG HELD MARCH 24, 1983 
This meeting is being held in the old court room, Summit County Court 
House, 60 North Main. 
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson called the meeting to order at 7:30 p.m. 
Councilmembers present were Grant Geary, Russell S. Judd, William M. 
Judd and Colleen R. Sargent with Gerald D. Ball absent due to work 
schedule. Also present were Violet V. Judd, Treasurer; Wendy D. Richins, 
Recorder; Terry Christianson, City Attorney; Stan Strebel and Jerry Smith, 
County Planning Commission; L. Craig Vernon, Robert K. Banz, Dennis Wright, 
Board of Adjustments; Woodrow Nielson, Edwin L. Judd, and Lafe Bowen, Plan-
ning Commission. 
Others in attendance were: 
Name Business (if applicable) 
Boyd E. Willoughby- - - - - - - - - - - - - Willoughby Oil Service 
Jim Blonquist 
Phyllis Smith -
Mrs. Richard Aoki 
Frank W. Moore- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bob Willoughby Businessman, homeowner, tax 
payer 
Thomas W. Moore - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Station Owner 
Marcie Palmer 
Roger Palmer - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Blair E. Blonquist Blonquist Mink Ranch 
Leon Simister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
George Wallace Wallace Enterprises -
E. Louise Wallace Mobile Home Park 
J. Rose Wallace 
Sharla Banz - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Dwain Clark 
R. R. Torman -
Ed Ercanbrack Station Owner 
Blaine C. Blonquist - - - - - - - - - - - - Blonquist Mink Ranch 
Afton W. Blonquist Blonquist Mink Ranch 
Gertrude Willoughby - - - - - - - - - - - -
Helen Blonquist Coalville Shopping Center 
Valley View Mobile Park 
R. Lynn Clark - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Reed Warner 
March 24, 1983 (cont) 
Special Meeting 
George and Louise Wallace are upset with the proposed Commercial 
Overlay because if they decide to sell their trailer park, the 
market value will be cut because of the new proposed zoning. They 
bought it as General Commercial and if they sell, they want to sell 
it as General Commercial, not Commercial Overlay. 
It was mentioned that Coalville City is trying to keep the oil well 
business and its people out of Coalville. Russell S. Judd wanted to 
set the record straight that Coalville City is not trying to keep the 
oil businesses out of the City. They have provided employment for 
alot of the towns people. 
Dennis Wright said that it is the landowners that control the City 
from growing. There are about six or seven people that will not 
sell any of their land. 
Leon Simister said that the restricted area of General Commercial 
will not let much development come in. We are very limited on Main 
Street. 
The Mayor recommended that the City Council put it back in the laps 
of the Planning Commission. They should advertise so the meetings 
can be attended by the the people if they so desire. In 30 days 
we should have it back so the Council can plan for another public 
hearing. 
The Mayor mentioned that the businessmen should get together and 
form a Chamber of Commerce. We need someone to represent Coalville 
City at the meetings we are invited to attend. 
Leon Simister thanked the Planning Commission for their time in 
working on the proposed zoning ordinances and for answering their 
questions tonight. 
Russell S. Judd mentioned that Buster Keyes would like the zoning 
on his property changed to Agricultural because he felt that best 
suited him for his ranching operation. 
Stan Strebel suggested that the businessmen as well as any residents 
make application in writting of the changes they would like to see in 
the new proposed zoning ordinances. They should have this done by 
Monday, April 11, 1983. They can be sent to City Hall and then given 
to the Planning Commission. The Mayor will put an article in the paper 
concerning this. By Monday, April 25, 1983, the revised ordinances 
should be given to the City Council. An advertisement will be pub-
lished on Friday, May 6, 1983 for a public hearing to be held on Mon-
day, May 23, 1983. William M. Judd made a motion that we refer any 
changes back to the Planning Commission and to follow through with 
the date schedules as outlined for the ordinance work. Russell S. 
Judd seconded the motion. All ayes. 
The citizens left at this time. 
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned the bill boards with All Associates. 
He mentioned the present schedule of the present bill boards. The Mayor 
said that the place where Billy's used to be is now open. It could be 
used as a "Welcome to Coalville" sign. Al Lundgren said his cost would 
not be more than $5,200.00. If Coalville City bought the sign, they 
would take over the lease on the land until it runs out with C. B. Cop-
ley. Terry Christianson said the bill should be itemized. He suggested 
that we make a decision now so this can be settled. He advised buying 
the sign so that we have a chance of getting the rest of the signs down, 
in the future. If we don't buy the sign, we will be back in litigation 
and with our present zoning ordinances, we would probably loose. If 
the City buys the sign, they will have to maintain it. As long as the 
March 24, 1983 (cont) 
Special Meeting 
contract is in force, we would have to pay the $200.00 a year and lease 
the property. Terry Christianson aaid we have four choices: 1. Sign 
the agreement and buy the sign so that all the signs will be down in 20 
years, 2. Go with the law suit that we will probably loose, leaving the 
signs up indefinitely, 3. Drop the law suit and the signs will be up as 
long as he wants them, or 4. Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made a motion 
that we purchase the sign in order to close the litigation. Colleen R. 
Sargent seconded the motion. All ayes, but Grant Geary who opposed. The 
Mayor and Attorney signed the Order of Dismissal. 
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned that he wrote a letter to Crandall 
Ford-Mercury dated March 10, 1983 concerning the $88.00 invoice no. 10742 
dated January 26, 1983. A reply written the next day was read by the 
Mayor. The invoice was itemized so the Council could see where the money 
was used. In addition, five quarts of oil and an oil filter were used and 
omitted from the invoice. William M. Judd made a motion to pay the $88.00 
invoice in full. Grant Geary seconded the motion. All ayes but Russell 
S. Judd who opposed. 
The Mayor mentioned that Utah Power & Light needs a Minute entry for 
electricity to be run to the new water storage tank at 600 South 200 
East. He also needs authorization to sign a sales tax exemption cer-
tificate on the water tank and an electric Service Agreement for both 
the water tank and the new sewer plant. Russell S. Judd made a motion 
to enter into the agreements with Utah Power & Light on the water tank 
and new sewer system. William M. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes. 
Terry Christianson, City Attorney, mentioned that he will not give any 
legal opinions to people who come in on City business. The Mayor or 
City Council will have to do this for the people if they deem it necessary. 
The reason for this was^the treatment he and his staff received when con-
tacted by an aggrevated citizen demanding the tapes from the Planning 
Commission meetings. 
R. Lynn Clark mentioned that he needs 1,000 rounds of ammunition for 
practice to maintain his position of being a certified officer. The 
Council approved. 
R. Lynn Clark showed three building permits for approval. Afton Blon-
quist would like to build a 25' x 200' mink shed. There are now 11 sheds 
on 3.5 acres. William M. Judd made a motion to approve the permit, se-
conded by Grant Geary. All ayes. 
Stan Strebel has a building permit for a double garage. Arnie Bosworth 
would also like to put in a double garage. Grant Geary made a motion to 
to accept both permits, seconded by William M. Judd. All ayes. 
The Mayor mentioned that he will be tied up for the next ten Mondays be-
ginning April 4, 1983. He has a class he has to attend. A Mayor Pro-Tem 
will be appointed to take over for him at any meetings. 
The Mayor mentioned the right-of-ways needed from Dave and Ren Wilde to 
get to the water storage tank. Dave has agreed on one water and sewer 
hookup and $1,500.00 in cash. He has requested a receipt for the hook-
ups. 
Ren Wilde could possibly settle for around $4,200.00. We can make ap-
plication to HUD to help on this. We will need a 66' street between 
Ren and Dave. This .8 of an acre will run around $15,000.00. A chain-
link fence will be put up on the South side of the street. 
Meeting adjourned at 10:30 p.m. 
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